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COMMENTS
FELONY CHARGE AFTER APPEAL OF ISDEMEANOR CONVICTION:
VIOLATION OF DuE PROCESS
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974)
After an altercation with a fellow inmate in a North Carolina prison,
petitioner was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, a misde-
meanor. Pursuant to North Carolina law, which gives a person con-
victed in a district court an unqualified right to a trial de novo in su-
perior court, petitioner filed a notice of appeal.' Before the new trial
began, the prosecutor obtained an indictment for felonious assault with
intent to kill based on the same conduct. Petitioner pleaded guilty to
the felony charge and was sentenced.2 A federal district court granted
a writ of habeas corpus,3 which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-290 (Supp. 1974). A number of other states have a sim-
ilar bifurcated procedure. For a partial list, see Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 112
x.4 (1972).
2. Petitioner Perry had been sentenced to a six month term on the misdemeanor
conviction, to be served after the term he was already serving. Following petitioner's
guilty plea to the felony charge, the superior court imposed a five to seven year term,
to be served concurrently with petitioner's present sentence. Since he had already served
some seventeen months of the latter sentence, the effect of the five to seven year con-
current sentence was to increase petitioner's potential confinement by seventeen months,
as opposed to the six month increase under the state district court sentence. Blackledge
v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 23 n.2 (1974).
3. Id. at 24. The federal district court, in an unreported opinion, held that the
imposition of the felony charge after the filing of the misdemeanor appeal violated peti-
tioner's fifth amendment rights under the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause. Id.
The double jeopardy clause was applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment
in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). The Perry federal district court relied
upon the double jeopardy reasoning of Wood v. Ross, 434 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1970),
a case similar to Perry that had been consolidated on appeal with another case, Rice
v. North Carolina. In Rice the defendant had been given a longer sentence at his de
novo trial for the same offense. Both cases were reversed on due process grounds for
reason of the imposition of the harsher sentences, thus making the double jeopardy hold-
ing an alternative. See 5 U. RICHMOND L. REv. 401 (1971). For a case with similar
facts, see Pettyjoh v. Evatt, 369 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Tenn.), a! d mem., 500 F.2d 1403
(6th Cir. 1974).
The Supreme Court had faced a situation somewhat comparable to Wood in United
States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966). Defendant's motion to vacate his conviction had
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affirmed." The Supreme Court affirmed and held: When a defendant
exercises his statutory right to a trial de novo on appeal from a misde-
meanor conviction, a state denies him due process of law if it then
brings a felony charge against him based upon the same conduct, when
there is no showing by the state that it was impossible to bring the more
serious charge at the outset.5
Although the Constitution does not require a state to provide appel-
late review of criminal cases, a number of decisions have indicated that,
"once established, these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned dis-
tinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts."0
been granted; thereafter the Government reindicted him on another charge related to
the same conduct. The new charge, however, carried a lesser penalty than the original.
The Court held that there was no violation of the double jeopardy clause, because there
was no finding of "oppressive or culpable governmental conduct inhering in [the] facts."
Id. at 123. Justices Brennan, Fortas, and Douglas, however, did find oppressive govern-
mental conduct. Id. at 125, 126 (Brennan, J., concurring, Fortas, J., dissenting). See
also Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 196 (1959) (separate opinion of Brennan,
J.); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
In Perry, the petitioner's earlier application for a writ of habeas corpus had been dis-
missed by the federal district court for failure to exhaust available state remedies. Black-
ledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 23 (1974). The court of appeals reversed, holding that
resort to the state courts was useless because two recent state cases had ruled on the
precise point. Perry-v. Blackledge, 453 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1971). The two cases cited
by the court of appeals, State v. Spencer, 276 N.C. 535, 173 S.E.2d 765 (1970), and
State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E.2d 897 (1970), however, did not involve more
serious charges at the new trial. The only issue presented was the imposition of longer
sentences. In fact, the single North Carolina case in point held that when an appeal
was taken to the superior court, the defendants were "entitled to a trial de novo on the
charge contained in the warrant, on which the appeal was taken." State v. Goff, 205
N.C. 545, 550, 172 S.E. 407, 409 (1934). In Goff, the defendants' original convictions
had been for assault, a misdemeanor. After appealing to the superior court, they were
indicted and convicted of felonious assault. The North Carolina Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the superior court "to be tried de novo on the warrant issued against
the defendants, for which they were convicted and appealed to the Superior Court." Id.
at 552, 172 S.E. at 410. Dicta in later cases, however, suggest a contrary result. See
State v. Davis, 261 N.C. 655, 657, 135 S.E.2d 663, 663 (1964); State v. Cooke, 246
N.C. 518, 521, 98 S.E.2d 885, 887 (1957).
Although Goff did not involve a plea of guilty to the felony charge, the North Caro-
lina law on the matter was less clear than the court of appeals in Perry indicated. Thus,
under the exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine enunciated in Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S.
114 (1944), and codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1970), the case probably should
not have been considered until a clear North Carolina ruling had been made.
4. Blackledge v. Perry, 475 F.2d 1400 (4th Cir. 1973).
5. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 29 (1974). The Court also considered
whether petitioner, as a result of his guilty plea, was precluded from raising his consti-
tutional claims through federal habeas corpus proceedings. See note 33 infra.
6. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966), quoted in Blackledge v. Perry, 417
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As the quoted language implies, the cases have relied principally on
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. More re-
cently, however, the Supreme Court has used the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause, supported by both the "chilling effect '7 and
the unconstitutional conditions8 doctrines, to insure that a criminal de-
fendant's statutory right to appeal is not unnecessarily impeded by the
state.9 Under the equal protection analysis, the issue is whether the
state's review procedure operates "in a way that discriminates against
some convicted defendants on account of their poverty,"'1 while the
question in the due process cases is whether the procedure under ex-
amination unnecessarily "chill[s] the exercise of basic constitutional
rights.""
The Supreme Court developed the due process "chilling effect"
analysis in the context of criminal appeals in North Carolina v.
Pearce.12  The Court had to decide whether, after a defendant had suc-
U.S. 21, 28 n.6 (1974); see Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown,
372 U.S. 477 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Smith v. Bennett,
365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956); ci. State v. Gurney, 37 Me. 156, 58 Am. Dec. 782 (1853) (statute requiring
court, upon appeal and trial de novo, to double penalty imposed by first trial court in
event of conviction held unconstitutional).
7. The "chilling effect" doctrine, which prohibits governmental acts that unneces-
uarily "chill the exercise of a constitutional right," was originally applied in first amend-
ment cases. See generally Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLum.
L. REv. 808 (1969). The leading criminal case applying the doctrine is United States
v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), which held that because only a jury could recommend
the death penalty under the Federal Kidnapping Act, the Act produced an unconstitu-
tional "chill" on a defendant's fifth amendment right not to plead guilty and his sixth
amendment right to trial by jury. Id. at 581-82. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965) (comment at trial by prosecutor about defendant's refusal to testify unconsti-
tutionally penalized defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent.)
8. The unconstitutional condition doctrine prohibits conditioning the receipt of a
governmental benefit or privilege upon the surrender of constitutional rights. See, e.g.,
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad
Comm'r, 271 U.S. 583 (1926); cf. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). See
generally Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 H.Iv. L. REv. 1595 (1960); Comment,
Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. RaV. 144 (1968).
9. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 724-25 (1969); cf. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 126 (1966) (Fortas,
J., dissenting).
10. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); see notes 6 & 7 supra.
11. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969), quoting United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968); see Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
12. 395 U.S. 711 (1969), noted in 19 AM. U.L. REv. 290 (1970), 58 KY. LJ. 380
(1969), 39 U. CN. L. Rav. 427 (1970), 5 U. RicHmoND L. Rav. 401 (1971).
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cessfully appealed an earlier conviction, a court upon retrial and convic-
tion could constitutionally impose a harsher sentence.' 8 After discard-
ing the double jeopardy' 4 and equal protection arguments,'" the Court
concluded that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
"requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully
attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he re-
ceives after a new trial."' Since Pearce's original appeal had alleged
the commission of constitutional error by the trial court,17 the threat
of increased punishment after a successful appeal would have "chilled
the exercise of basic constitutional rights."' s In the case of convictions
set aside for nonconstitutional error, the Court applied a general due
process notion of fundamental fairness:' 9 If a state provides a right to
criminal appellate review, it may not punish or even appear to threaten
punishment of those who seek to exercise that right.2 0
13. See Aplin, Sentence Increases on Retrial After North Carolina v. Pearce, 39 U.
CiN. L. REv. 427 (1970); Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the
Successful Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965); Note, supra note 7, at 837-40;
Comment, supra note 8; Note, In Van Alstyne's Wake: North Carolina v. Pearce, 31
U. PrrT. L. REv. 101 (1969).
14. 395 U.S. at 719-21, citing Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), and
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
15. 395 U.S. at 722-23.
16. Id. at 725. To insure that vindictiveness is not a factor, the Court required that
whenever a judge imposes a harsher punishment at a new trial, the reasons must appear
in the record and must be based upon behavior of the defendant since the time of the
original sentencing. Id. at 726.
17. Pearce's conviction was reversed because an involuntary confession had been ad-
mitted into evidence. Id. at 713.
18. Id. at 724, quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968). Al-
though the Court is unclear on the point, the object of the "chill" in Pearce apparently
was the petitioner's exercise of his statutory right to appeal to remedy the constitutional
error in his first trial.
The "unconstitutional conditions" thesis maintains that requiring a defendant to risk
harsher punishment upon retrial as a condition of receiving a fundamentally fair trial
serves no justifiable state interest that would counterbalance the required surrender of
constitutional rights. See Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 613 & n.25.
19. 395 U.S. at 723-25; see Note, In Van Alstyne's Wake, supra note 13, at 106;
80 HAtv. L. REv. 891, 897-98 (1967). The Court, however, also relied in part upon
the equal protection cases, see note 6 supra and accompanying text, and several lower
federal court cases, Worcester v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 713, 718 (1st Cir. 1966);
Short v. United States, 344 F.2d 550, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Nichols v. United States,
106 F. 672, 679 (8th Cir. 1901), which asserted that a price could not be placed on
appeals. 395 U.S. at 723-24.
20. 395 U.S. at 723-25. There is an obvious analytical problem which the Court
had to resolve: If there is no constitutional right to appeal a conviction, what constitu-
tional right is violated if a state "chills" the exercise of a statutory right to appeal whenhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/7
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Two post-Pearce cases emphasized that the due process review is
concerned only with guarding against vindictive motivation on the part
of the trial court rather than the possibility of increased punishment.
In Colten v. Kentucky2l the Supreme Court held that the Pearce rule
did not apply when a greater punishment was imposed after a trial de
novo in Kentucky's two-tiered trial system, which is comparable to that
of North Carolina. The court that imposed the harsher sentence was
not the one whose judgment was reversed, and the possibility that per-
sonal vindictiveness caused the harsher sentence was considered to be
minimal.22 In Chaffin v. Stynchcombe23 the Court noted that Pearce
had involved a trial judge who had been reversed, and held that a
harsher sentence imposed by a jury upon retrial did not violate due
process, provided the jury had no knowledge of the earlier sentence.2 4
In Blackledge v. Perry,25 the Court based its decision upon Pearce,
Colten, and Chaffin and concluded that the possibility of vindictiveness
on the part of the prosecutor was so great that it was a denial of due
process of law to allow him to bring felony charges against a convicted
misdemeanant who wished to pursue his statutory right to appeal. 26
The Court reasoned that a prosecutor has a considerable interest in dis-
couraging appeals since they
clearly require increased expenditures of prosecutorial resourses before
the defendant's conviction becomes final, and may even result in a for-
merly convicted defendant going free. And, if the prosecutor has the
means readily at hand to discourage such appeals-by "upping the ante"
through a felony indictment ... the State can insure that only the
most hardy defendants will brave the hazards of a de novo trial.2 7
Although the reasoning in Pearce and Perry is comparable, the hold-
ing of the latter case is broader because the Court prohibited virtually
the defendant alleges only nonconstitutional error? While the inclusion of this situation
in the ruling should promote the consistent treatment of defendants, the Court's reason-
ing on the issue lacked the precision of its earlier analysis of appeals from constitutional
error.
21. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
22. Id. at 116-17.
23. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
24. Id. at 26.
25. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
26. Id. at 28-29. The Court did make clear, however, that if a state shows it was
impossible to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset-for example, when a vic-
tim dies in the interval between the first and second trials--a more serious charge on
trial de novo is permissible. Id. at 29 n.7.
27. Id. at 27-28.
DUE PROCESS
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all prosecution on more serious charges, 28 notwithstanding the prose-
cutor's demonstration of nonvindictive reasons. This complete bar, in
part, prompted Mr. Justice Rehnquist to dissent. In his view, a prose-
cutor could have legitimate reasons for preferring to bring only misde-
meanor charges in the lower court, even though the defendant might
be guilty of a felony.29 Once a convicted defendant appeals and is be-
fore the superior court, there may be no reason for the prosecutor not
to proceed on the felony charge. 0 This analysis, however, neglects
the primary evil that concerned the majority of the Court in both Pearce
and Perry-restrictions of the exercise of a statutory right to appeal.
Moreover, the difficulty of distinguishing vindictive and nonvindictive
indictments 1 further justifies the broader holding of Perry.
Given the validity of the Pearce doctrine, that once a state establishes
appellate procedures a defendant should be able to pursue his appeal
without fear of retaliation, 2 the Perry result seems to be a sound83 and
28. Id. at 28; see note 26 supra.
29. 417 U.S. at 34. Mr. Justice Rehnquist noted in particular the less burdensome
procedures of the lowest level state courts.
30. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31. In Pearce the Court required that the reasons for a longer sentence "must be
based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the de-
fendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding." 395 U.S. at
726. Under Mr. Justice Rehnquist's view in Perry, however, the prosecutor supposedly
would not have to justify his indictment by reporting any intervening behavior of the
defendant. He would only need to assert that he had believed the defendant to be guilty
of the felony in the first instance but had wanted to spare the state the expense of a
felony trial. Additionally, under Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), a prosecutor
would not be precluded from seeking a harsher sentence at the new trial if he could con-
vince the court that he had justifiable reasons for doing so.
Allowing indictment for a more serious offense would seem justifiable when a defend-
ant has plea bargained. If the defendant appeals, which is permissible under the North
Carolina system, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-290 (Supp. 1974), allowing a more serious in-
dictment would seem fair, unless, of course, the plea was involuntary.
32. The uncertainty suggested by this clause follows from the imprecise constitu-
tional underpinning of the Pearce rationale regarding appeals from nonconstitutional er-
ror. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
33. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, however, found fault with the majority's conclusion that
the vindictiveness to be prevented was indictment for a felony charge itself, rather than
the imposition of a longer sentence. 417 U.S. at 37. Consequently, he favored remand-
ing to the state court (assuming a violation of the Pearce standards) for a resentencing
in accordance with Pearce. Id. at 37-38. The majority's reference to the collateral con-
sequences of a felony conviction, id. at 28 n.6, was a partial answer to Justice Rehn-
quist's criticism.
In an analogous situation involving the double jeopardy clause, the Court found re-
versible error in the exposure of a defendant to the possibility of conviction for an of-
fense for which he was not liable. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970). In Price,https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/7
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the defendant had been convicted in a murder trial of the lesser-included offense of man-
slaughter. After that verdict was set aside on appeal, he was retried for murder, con-
trary to Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), and again convicted of man-
daughter. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, rejecting the state's argument
that the error was harmless because the defendant had been convicted of the same crime
at both trials and was not given a harsher sentence. The Court noted that the double
jeopardy clause
is cast in terms of the risk or hazard of trial and conviction, not of the ultimate
legal consequences of the verdict. To be charged and to be subjected to a sec-
ond trial for first-degree murder is an ordeal not to be viewed lightly.
398 U.S. at 331. The Court added that in such a situation the defendant "must be pre-
pared to meet not only the evidence of the prosecution and the verdict of the jury but
the verdict of the community as well." Id. at 331 n.10. The same reasoning would
apply in the Perry situation, particularly because Perry was actually convicted of the fel-
ony and not just exposed to the possibility of conviction.
There was another issue before the Court in Perry: Was the petitioner precluded
by his guilty plea from raising his constitutional claims in a federal habeas corpus pro-
ceeding? In answering that question in the negative, the Court first distinguished Tollett
v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973). The issue in Tollett was
whether a state prisoner, pleading guilty with the advice of counsel, may later
obtain release through federal habeas corpus by proving only that the indict-
ment to which he pleaded was returned by an unconstitutionally selected grand
jury.
Id. at 260. The Court answered the question in the negative characterizing the guilty
plea as "a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process."
Id. at 267. A petitioner would only be able to obtain federal relief in such cases (that
is, cases involving allegations of constitutional violations that occurred prior to a plea
of guilty) when he could prove that the advice received from counsel was so incompe-
tent that it precluded a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty. Id.
The Perry Court distinguished Tollett by pointing out that the constitutional claim
presented by Perry was, in effect, a plea in bar, which "went to the very power of the
State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him." 417
U.S. at 30. Mr. Justice Rehnquist seemed to recognize the distinction in his majority
opinion in Tollett:
A guilty plea, voluntarily and intelligently entered, may not be vacated because
the defendant was not advised of every conceivable constitutional plea in abate-
ment he might have to the charge, no matter how peripheral such a plea might
be to the normal focus of counsel's inquiry.....
...Often the interests of the accused are not advanced by challenges that
would only delay the inevitable date of prosecution.
411 U.S. at 267, 268.
In spite of his apparent recognition of the difference between a defect that could be
corrected and one that could not, Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissented in Perry on this issue
and stated that any difference in the two cases was "at most semantic." 417 U.S. at
36. This conclusion is explained in part by his analysis of the principal issue under
discussion. He was not convinced that the state's action was a denial of due process.
See notes 29 & 30 supra and accompanying text.
The majority did fail to make clear how its due process bar differed from a double
jeopardy claim. The latter is an explicit constitutional right forbidding prosecution in
certain cases; nevertheless, it has been held to be waived by a plea of guilty. United('fates v. Hoyland, 264 F.2d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 1959); Caballero v. Hudspeth, 114 F.2d
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just application of the rule. 4 While the incidence of the prosecutorial
abuse described in Perry is unknown, 5 the Court's reasoning could be
applied to cases in which a prosecutor brings a more serious felony
charge after a less serious felony conviction has been reversed. Such
a case may well involve retrial after the defendant's guilty plea had
been set aside. Whether the Pearce and Perry rationale will be ex-
tended remains to be seen.36
545, 547 (10th Cir. 1940). But cf. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973); McNeal
v. Hallowell, 481 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1973).
34. Arguably, however, the Court should not have reached the merits of the case,
See note 3 supra.
Another argument that is available in some cases similar to Perry is that the filing
of more serious charges chills the exercise of defendant's right to a jury trial, a right
made applicable to state court trials in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). In
some bifurcated trial systems, including North Carolina's, a jury trial is not available
until the second trial in the superior court. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-196(b) (1969). The
Supreme Court has approved such bifurcated procedures, Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S.
104, 118-19 (1972). This argument was not available to petitioner in Perry, however,
because the Supreme Court has not required that states make a jury trial available when
the maximum possible term of incarceration does not exceed six months, Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), and the original misdemeanor charge was not punishable by
incarceration for more than six months. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33(c) (1969), as
amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33(b) (Supp. 1974) (maximum term increased to two
years).
35. The question had been raised on appeal before Perry. Wood v. Ross, 434 F.2d
297 (4th Cir. 1970) (alternative holding) (practice constituted double jeopardy); Petty-
john v. Evatt, 369 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Tenn.) (retrial on more serious offense barred);
State v. Goff, 205 N.C. 545, 172 S.E. 407 (1934) (defendants entitled to trial de novo
on charge from which appeal was taken).
36. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue. Cf. United States v. Ewell,
383 U.S. 116 (1965). State and lower federal courts have divided on the issue. Com-
pare Mullreed v. Kropp, 425 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1970) (more serious charge not al-
lowed), and People v. McMiller, 389 Mich. 425, 208 N.W.2d 451 (1973) (same), with
Ward v. Page, 424 F.2d 491 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 917 (1970) (more seri-
ous charge allowed), and Commonwealth v. Therrien, 359 Mass. 500, 269 N.E.2d 687
(1971) (same).
One court, relying on Pearce and Perry has found a due process violation in the rein-
dictment of the accused for first degree murder after their original trial for second degree
murder ended in a mistrial. United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/7
